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Abstract
Although theory on corruption is well developed, it has proven difficult to isolate corrupt behavior
empirically. In this paper, we provide overwhelming statistical evidence documenting match rigging in
Japanese sumo wrestling. A non-linearity in the incentive structure of promotion leads to gains from trade
between wrestlers on the margin for achieving a winning record and their opponents. We show that wrestlers
win a disproportionate share of the matches when they are on the margin. Collusion, rather than increased
effort, appears to explain the results. Wrestlers who are victorious when needing a victory lose more often than
would be expected the next time they meet that same opponent, suggesting that part of the payment for
throwing a match is future payment in kind. Cheating disappears in times of high media scrutiny. In addition
to collusion by individual wrestlers, there is also evidence of reciprocity agreements across stables of wrestlers,
suggesting a centralized element to the match rigging.
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Winning Isn’t Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling
By MARK DUGGAN AND STEVEN D. LEVITT*
There is a growing appreciation among econ-
omists of the need to better understand the role
that corruption plays in real-world economies.
Although some have argued that it can be wel-
fare enhancing (Nathaniel Leff, 1964), most
commentators believe that a willingness to ac-
cept bribes (or similar forms of corruption) in
either the public or the private sector reduces
economic efficiency (Andrei Shleifer and
Robert W. Vishny, 1993). As a result, govern-
ments and firms often create incentives to mo-
tivate their employees to be honest (Gary S.
Becker and George J. Stigler, 1974).
While it is generally agreed that corruption is
widespread, there is little rigorous empirical
research on the subject. Because of corruption’s
illicit nature, those who engage in corruption
attempt not to leave a trail. As a consequence,
much of the existing evidence on corruption is
anecdotal in nature. More systematic empirical
substantiation of corrupt practices is unlikely to
appear in typical data sources. Rather, research-
ers must adopt nonstandard approaches in an
attempt to ferret out indirect evidence of
corruption.
To date, there have been only a handful of
studies that attempt to systematically document
the impact of corruption on economic out-
comes. The first empirical study of corruption
dates to 1846 when Quetelet documented that
the height distribution among French males
based on measurements taken at conscription
was normally distributed except for a puzzling
shortage of men measuring 1.57–1.597 meters
(roughly 5 feet 2 inches to 5 feet 3 inches) and
an excess number of men below 1.57 meters.
Not coincidentally, the minimum height for
conscription into the Imperial army was 1.57
meters (Stephen Stigler, 1986). More recent em-
pirical work on corruption includes Robert H.
Porter and J. Douglas Zona (1993), which finds
evidence that construction companies collude
when bidding for state highway contracts by
meeting before the auction, designating a seri-
ous bidder, and having other cartel members
submit correspondingly higher bids. R. Preston
McAfee (1992) details a wide variety of bid-
rigging schemes. Paulo Mauro (1995) uses sub-
jective indices of corruption across countries to
demonstrate a correlation between corrupt gov-
ernments and lower rates of economic growth,
although the relationship may not be causal.
Ray Fisman (2001) analyzes how stock prices
of Indonesian firms fluctuate with changes in
former Prime Minister Suharto’s health status.
Firms with close connections to Suharto, which
presumably benefit from corruption within the
regime, decline substantially more than other
Indonesian firms when Suharto’s health weak-
ens. Whether the rents accruing to those close to
Suharto are due to corruption or simply bad
policy, however, is hard to determine. Rafael Di
Tella and Ernesto Schargrodsky (2000) docu-
ment that the prices paid for basic inputs at
public hospitals in Buenos Aires fall by 10–20
percent after a corruption crackdown.
In this paper we look for corruption among
Japan’s elite sumo wrestlers. While acknowl-
edging that sumo wrestling is not itself a subject
of direct interest to economists, we believe that
this case study nonetheless provides potentially
valuable insights. First, if corrupt practices
thrive here, one might suspect that no institution
is safe. Sumo wrestling is the national sport of
Japan, with a 2,000-year tradition and a focus
on honor, ritual, and history that may be unpar-
alleled in athletics.1 Moreover, Japan is generally
* Duggan: Department of Economics, University of Chi-
cago, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, and National
Bureau of Economic Research (e-mail: mduggan@midway
.uchicago.edu); Levitt: American Bar Foundation and De-
partment of Economics, University of Chicago, 1126 East
59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637 (e-mail: slevitt@midway
.uchicago.edu). We would like to thank Gary Becker, Casey
Mulligan, Andrei Shleifer, Stephen Stigler, Mark West, two
anonymous referees, seminar participants, and especially
Serguey Braguinsky for helpful comments. Kyung-Hong
Park provided truly outstanding research assistance. Levitt
gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Na-
tional Science Foundation and Sloan Foundation.
1 See Mark West (1997) for an examination of the legal
rules and informal norms that govern sumo wrestling in Japan.
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found to have relatively low rates of corruption
in cross-country comparisons (Transparency In-
ternational, 2000).2 Second, because of the sim-
plicity of the institutional framework, it is easy
to understand and model the incentives facing
participants. Third, data to test for match rig-
ging are readily available. While the exact tech-
niques we utilize for studying corrupt behavior
in sumo wrestling will require modification be-
fore being applied to more substantive applica-
tions, our analysis may nonetheless aid future
researchers in that task.
The key institutional feature of sumo wres-
tling that makes it ripe for corruption is the
existence of a sharp nonlinearity in the payoff
function for competitors. A sumo tournament
(basho) involves 66 wrestlers (rikishi) partici-
pating in 15 bouts each. A wrestler who
achieves a winning record (eight wins or more,
known as kachi-koshi) is guaranteed to rise up
the official ranking (banzuke); a wrestler with a
losing record (make-koshi) falls in the rankings.
A wrestler’s rank is a source of prestige, the
basis for salary determination, and also influ-
ences the perks that he enjoys.3
Figure 1 demonstrates empirically the impor-
tance of an eighth win to a wrestler. The hori-
zontal axis of the figure is the number of wins a
wrestler achieves in a tournament; the vertical
axis is the average change in rank as a conse-
quence of the tournament. The change in rank is
a positive function of the number of wins. With
the exception of the eighth win, the relationship
is nearly linear: each additional victory is worth
approximately three spots in the rankings. The
critical eighth win—which results in a substan-
tial promotion in rank rather than a demotion—
garners a wrestler approximately 11 spots in the
ranking, or roughly four times the value of the
typical victory. Consequently, a wrestler enter-
ing the final match of a tournament with a 7-7
record has far more to gain from a victory than
an opponent with a record of, say, 8-6 has to
lose. There will also be incentives for forward-
looking wrestlers to rig matches on earlier days
of the tournament.4 According to our rough
calculations, moving up a single spot in the
rankings is worth on average approximately
$3,000 a year to a wrestler, so the potential
gains to trade may be substantial if the wrestlers
fix a match.5 Of course, no legally binding
contract can be written.
In this paper, we examine more than a decade
of data for Japan’s sumo elite in search of
evidence demonstrating or refuting claims of
match rigging. We uncover overwhelming evi-
dence that match rigging occurs in the final days
of sumo tournaments. Wrestlers who are on the
margin for attaining their eighth victory win far
more often than would be expected. High win-
ning percentages by themselves, however, are
2 Nevertheless, in recent years, sumo wrestling has been
dogged by allegations of rigged matches, none of which
have been substantiated. Officials from the Japanese Sumo
Association dismiss these complaints as fabrications on the
part of disgraced former wrestlers. Ultimately, despite years
of allegations, no formal disciplinary actions have been
taken towards any wrestler.
3 For instance, the lowest-ranked wrestlers in the heya
must rise early each morning to clean the building and
prepare the food for the main meal of the day. When a
wrestler reaches the rank of juryo, placing him among the
top 66 sumo wrestlers in Japan, he no longer is required to
do chores for other rikishi. Those in the top 40 with ranks of
maegashira or better have their own servants.
4 An earlier version of this paper, Duggan and Levitt
(2001), derive a formal model of the incentives facing partic-
ipants. For wrestlers on the bubble, the incentive to rig matches
increases monotonically over the course of a tournament.
5 Wrestlers ranked between fifth and tenth earn an annual
income—including only official wages, bonuses, and prize
money—of roughly $250,000 per year. The fortieth-ranked
wrestler earns approximately $170,000. The seventieth-
ranked wrestler receives only about $15,000 per year (no
official salary, just a small stipend to cover tournament
expenses, some prize money, and room and board). All
information on annual salaries are based on the authors’
calculations and information provided in Mina Hall (1997).
Unofficial sources of income such as endorsements would
likely increase the disparity between the top and bottom
wrestlers.
FIGURE 1. PAYOFF TO TOURNAMENT WINS
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far from conclusive proof of match rigging.
Those wrestlers who are on the margin for
achieving the eighth win may exert greater ef-
fort because their reward for winning is larger.
We offer a number of pieces of evidence against
this alternative hypothesis. First, whereas the
wrestler who is on the margin for an eighth win
is victorious with a surprisingly high frequency,
the next time that those same two wrestlers face
each other, it is the opponent who has an un-
usually high win percentage.6 This result sug-
gests that at least part of the currency used in
match rigging is promises of throwing future
matches in return for taking a fall today. Sec-
ond, win rates for wrestlers on the bubble vary
in accordance with factors predicted by theory
to support implicit collusion. For example, suc-
cess rates for wrestlers on the bubble rise
throughout the career (consistent with the de-
velopment of reputation), but fall in the last year
of a wrestler’s career. Third, match rigging dis-
appears during times of increased media scru-
tiny. Fourth, some wrestling stables (known as
heya) appear to have worked out reciprocity
agreements with other stables such that wres-
tlers from either stable do exceptionally well on
the bubble against one another.7 Finally, wres-
tlers identified as “not corrupt” by two former
sumo wrestlers who have alleged match rigging
do no better in matches on the bubble than in
typical matches, whereas those accused of being
corrupt are extremely successful on the bubble.
It is difficult to reconcile any of these findings
with effort as the primary explanation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section I introduces the data used in
the analysis and presents the empirical evidence
documenting the strong performance of wres-
tlers on the bubble. Section II attempts to dis-
tinguish between increased effort and match
rigging as an explanation for the observed pat-
terns in the data and also considers the way in
which the market for rigged matches operates,
e.g., how contracts are enforced, the use of cash
payments versus promises of future thrown
matches, and individuals versus stables as the
level at which deals are brokered. Section III
concludes with a discussion of the broader eco-
nomic implications of our analysis.
I. Evidence of Strong Performance
on the Bubble
Our data set consists of almost every official
sumo match that took place in the top rank
(Sekitori) of Japanese sumo wrestling between
January 1989 and January 2000. Six tourna-
ments are held a year, with nearly 70 wrestlers
per tournament, and 15 bouts per wrestler.
Thus, our initial data set consists of over 64,000
wrestler-matches representing over 32,000 total
bouts (since there are two wrestlers per bout). A
small number of observations (less than 5 per-
cent of the total data set) are discarded due to
missing data, coding errors, or early withdrawal
from the tournament due to injury. A total of
281 wrestlers appear in our data, with the aver-
age number of observations per wrestler in a
randomly selected match equal to 554, and a
maximum of 990. The average number of total
matches between the same two wrestlers com-
peting in a randomly selected match is 10; thus
we often have many observations involving the
same two wrestlers at different points in time.
For each observation, we know the identity of
the two competitors, who wins, the month and
year of the tournament, and the day of the match
(tournaments last 15 days with one match per
wrestler per day). For roughly 98 percent of the
sample, we also know what wrestling stable the
wrestlers belong to; information is missing for
some wrestlers in the early part of our sample
who had only a short stint in the top ranks.
We begin by looking at the distribution of
wins across wrestlers at the end of tournaments.
We expect that a disproportionate number of
wrestlers should finish with eight wins because
of the high payoff associated with the eighth
win (see Figure 1). To the extent that wrestlers
are rigging matches not only on the final day,
but also in the days immediately preceding the
end of the tournament, extra weight should also
be observed on nine wins, as wrestlers who are
close to the margin on days 13 or 14 may buy
wins that ultimately were not needed to reach
eight wins due to subsequent victories. Figure
2 presents a histogram of final wins for the
60,000 wrestler-tournament observations in
which a wrestler completes exactly 15 matches.
For purposes of comparison, we also present the
6 By the second subsequent meeting, the winning per-
centages revert back to the expected levels, suggesting that
deals between individual wrestlers span only two matches.
7 Wrestlers in the same stable do not wrestle each other.
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expected pattern of results assuming that all
wrestlers are identical and that match outcomes
are independently distributed.
Figure 2 provides clear visual evidence in
support of the model’s prediction. Approxi-
mately 26.0 percent of all wrestlers finish with
exactly eight wins, compared to only 12.2 per-
cent with seven wins. The binomial distribution
predicts that these two outcomes should occur
with an equal frequency of 19.6 percent. The
null hypothesis that the probability of seven and
eight wins is equal can be rejected at resounding
levels of statistical significance. Nine victories
also appears more often than would be ex-
pected. Although this distortion is far less pro-
nounced visually, nine victories is significantly
more likely than six (16.2 percent versus 13.9
percent).
Further evidence that wrestlers on the bubble
win far more often than would be expected
comes from estimating regressions of the gen-
eral form
(1) Winijtd  Bubbleijtd  Rankdiffijt
 ij  it  ijtd
where i and j represent the two wrestlers, t
corresponds to a particular tournament, and d is
the day of the tournament. The unit of observa-
tion is a wrestler-match. Bubble is a vector of
indicator variables capturing whether wrestler i
or j is on the margin for reaching eight wins in
the bout in question. The Bubble variables are
coded 1 if only the wrestler is on the margin,
1 if only the opponent is on the margin, and 0
if neither or both of the combatants are on the
margin in the match. Rankdiff is the gap be-
tween the official ranking of wrestlers i and j
entering tournament t. In some regressions, we
include fixed effects for each wrestler and each
opponent; in other specifications we include
wrestler-opponent interactions. In all cases, we
estimate linear probability models, with stan-
dard errors corrected to take into account the
fact that a match is included in the data set
twice—once for wrestler i and once for wrestler j.
Table 1 reports the excess win percentages
for wrestlers on the margin, by day, for the last
five days of the tournament. On day 15, only
wrestlers with exactly seven wins are on the
margin; on day 14, wrestlers with either six or
seven wins are on the margin, etc. The six
columns correspond to different regression
specifications. The even columns include the
differences in ranks for the two wrestlers enter-
ing this tournament. The first two columns have
no wrestler fixed effects; columns (3) and (4)
include both wrestler and opponent fixed effects.
The final two columns add wrestler-opponent
interactions so that the identification comes
only from deviations in this match relative to
other matches involving the same two wrestlers.
The results in Table 1 are quite similar across
specifications.8 Wrestlers on the bubble on day
15 are victorious roughly 25 percent more often
than would be expected. Win percentages are
elevated about 15 percent on day 14, 11 percent
on day 13, and 5 percent on day 12 for wrestlers
on the margin. There is no statistically signifi-
cant evidence of elevated win rates for wrestlers
on the bubble on day 11. The pattern of coeffi-
cients is consistent with the hypothesis that the
frequency of match rigging will rise as the tour-
nament comes to a close. If all of the excess
wins are due to rigging, then the results imply
that on day 15 half of the bubble matches are
crooked. For days 14, 13, and 12 respectively,
the estimated percentage of rigged matches is
roughly 28, 22, and 10 percent respectively.
8 Adding the difference in current rank between wres-
tlers has little impact on the other coefficients in the regres-
sion. The difference in ranks is an important predictor of
match outcomes when wrestler fixed effects are excluded
from the model. The top-ranked wrestler facing an average
wrestler would be expected to win about 70 percent of the
time. Once we control for wrestler fixed effects, however,
the explanatory power of the difference in ranks disappears.
FIGURE 2. WINS IN A SUMO TOURNAMENT
(ACTUAL VS. BINOMIAL)
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II. Distinguishing Between Match Rigging
and Effort
The empirical results presented thus far are
consistent with a model in which opponents
throw matches to allow wrestlers on the margin
to achieve an eighth victory. The results, how-
ever, are also consistent with a scenario in
which effort is an important determinant of the
match outcome, and wrestlers on the bubble,
having more to gain from a win, exert greater
effort.9 In this section, we present a wide variety
of analyses that appear to confirm the corruption
story and rule out effort as the explanation.
A. What Characteristics Influence the
Likelihood of Winning When on the Bubble?
We begin by analyzing the personal and sit-
uational characteristics that influence the suc-
cess rate of the wrestler on the bubble. One
potentially important determinant of the fre-
quency of match rigging is the probability that
the collusive behavior will be detected. During
our sample, there have been two periods in
9 The results are also consistent with a model in which
wrestlers show altruism for one another, sacrificing their
own outcomes to help an opponent who has more to gain.
Given the nature of athletics and the nontrivial cost to the
wrestler of losing the match (roughly $10,000), the altruism
story strikes us as an unlikely explanation.
TABLE 1—EXCESS WIN PERCENTAGES FOR WRESTLERS ON THE MARGIN FOR ACHIEVING AN EIGHTH WIN,
BY DAY OF THE MATCH
On the Margin on: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Day 15 0.244 0.249 0.249 0.255 0.260 0.264
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022)
Day 14 0.150 0.155 0.152 0.157 0.168 0.171
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Day 13 0.096 0.107 0.110 0.118 0.116 0.125
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)
Day 12 0.038 0.061 0.064 0.082 0.073 0.076
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Day 11 0.000 0.018 0.015 0.025 0.010 0.012
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Rank difference — 0.0053 — 0.0020 — 0.0020
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Constant 0.500 0.500 — — — —
(0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.008 0.018 0.030 0.031 0.0634 0.0653
Number of observations 64,272 62,708 64,272 62,708 64,272 62,708
Wrestler and opponent fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wrestler-opponent interactions No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator variable corresponding to whether or not a wrestler wins the
match. The unit of observation is a wrestler-match. Values reported in the table are coefficients associated with an indicator
variable taking the value 1 if only the wrestler is on the margin for achieving eight wins, 1 if only the opponent is on the
margin for achieving eight wins, and 0 otherwise. On day 15, only wrestlers with seven wins are on the margin. On day 14,
wrestlers with six or seven wins are on the margin. On day 13, wrestlers with five, six, or seven wins are on the margin, and
so on. The omitted category in all regressions is all wrestlers who are not on the margin for achieving eight wins, as well as
wrestlers in matches in which both participants are on the margin for eight wins. When a full set of wrestler and opponent
fixed effects are included, the constant is omitted. In all cases, standard errors are corrected to account for the fact that there
are two observations per bout (one for each wrestler). The differences in the wrestler rank variable is the numerical rank order
of the wrestler minus that of his opponent, based on official rankings published prior to each tournament. This variable is
missing for part of our sample.
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which media attention has focused on match
rigging. The first of these was in April and May
of 1996. A former sumo wrestler who had be-
come a stable-master came forward with alle-
gations of match rigging. At the same time,
another former wrestler also came forward to
decry rigged matches. Ironically, both of these
men died a few weeks later, just hours apart, in
the same hospital. This fueled speculation
among the media of foul play, although a sub-
sequent police investigation revealed no evi-
dence for this. The second period of media
scrutiny took place in late 1999–early 2000. A
former sumo wrestler named Itai raised allega-
tions of match rigging that were widely covered
by the media, even in the United States. The
three tournaments in our sample that are most
likely to be affected by the media attention are
those held in May 1996, November 1999, and
January 2000.
The literature on repeated-play games (e.g.,
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, 1991) sug-
gests that the ability to sustain collusion should
be positively related to the frequency with
which two wrestlers expect to meet in the future
since more future meetings imply the availabil-
ity of more severe punishments for wrestlers
who do not cooperate. Empirically, we proxy
the expected frequency of future matches using
two variables: (1) the number of meetings be-
tween the two wrestlers that took place in the
preceding year, and (2) whether the wrestler is
in the last year of his career. Although the
precise ending of a wrestler’s career is not
known in advance to the participants, it is likely
that signals of retirement are available (e.g.,
declining performance, injuries, etc.).10 If it
takes time to establish a reputation as a wrestler
who is willing to collude and who can be
trusted, then one might predict that the longer a
wrestler has been active in the top ranks of
sumo, the better he will do when he is on the
bubble, and also, the worse he will perform
when the opponent is on the bubble.
Because there are a series of monetary prizes
given to wrestlers who have good records in a
given tournament, wrestlers in the running for
such prizes are unlikely to be willing to throw
matches.11 The overall tournament champion
wins $100,000; the juryo champion wins
$20,000. In addition, $20,000 awards for “fight-
ing spirit” and “outstanding technique.” In order
to win those prizes, wrestlers must compile very
strong records. The potential value of a victory
for a wrestler in the running for such prizes is
likely to be at least as great as the value to a
wrestler on the margin for an eighth win.
A final determinant of match rigging that we
consider is the possibility of coordinated match
rigging among stables of wrestlers. The lives of
sumo wrestlers center around the stable with
which they are associated. Stable-masters exert
a tremendous influence over both the wrestling
career of wrestlers and their lives more gener-
ally.12 Given the important role of the stable,
and the fact that stable-masters benefit from
having highly ranked wrestlers, it would not be
surprising if corruption were coordinated at the
stable level. For example, stables might have
collective reputations, with stable-masters en-
forcing punishments on wrestlers who pursue
their individual best interests at the expense of
the stable. Some stable-masters, on the other
hand, may not condone match rigging because
of ethical concerns or risk aversion.
We empirically examine one particular form
of stable-level collusion: the presence of reci-
procity agreements across stables. If such deals
existed, one would expect both that wrestlers
from stable A will have very high win rates
when on the bubble facing wrestlers from stable
B, and vice versa.13 It is difficult to tell an
alternative story that would account for such a
pattern in the data. For instance, if effort is the
10 In order to minimize endogeneity, we exclude the very
last tournament of a wrestler’s career. It is possible that a
loss on the bubble may drop the wrestler out of the top level
of wrestlers, inducing retirement. Including the last tourna-
ment of a wrestler’s career slightly increased the magnitude
and statistical significance of the coefficient.
11 Although we do not directly observe which wrestlers
might be under consideration for these prizes, having one of
the five best records (plus ties) up until that point in the
tournament is an excellent predictor. Wrestlers with one of
the five best records in the tournament entering days 13, 14,
or 15 win a prize 50 percent of the time. Less than five
percent of wrestlers with records outside the top five on
days 13–15 eventually win a prize.
12 For instance, it is expected that the foremost sumo wres-
tler in a stable will marry the daughter of the stable-master.
13 The variable we use to test this empirically is the
overall win rate for wrestlers on the bubble in matches
involving both a wrestler from stable A and a wrestler from
stable B (excluding the current match). This variable reflects
both stable A’s success on the bubble against stable B and
stable B’s success against stable A.
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story, then stables with wrestlers capable of
exerting particularly high effort when they need
a win might also be expected to have wrestlers
who rise to the occasion when faced with the
opportunity to beat a very motivated opponent,
leading to a zero or negative correlation. Simi-
larly, if one stable has developed specific tech-
niques that provide it with an advantage over a
particular stable, success rates on the bubble
will again be negatively related.
These various hypotheses are tested in Table 2.
Because our interest is in how these factors
influence success on the bubble, the table re-
ports only the coefficients on the interactions
between these various factors and the outcome
of bubble matches, i.e., any incremental impact
that these factors have on bubble matches above
and beyond their impact in nonbubble matches.
Also included in the specifications, but not
shown in the table, are the main effects. Column
(1) is the baseline specification. Column (2)
adds both wrestler and opponent fixed effects.
Column (3) also includes wrestler-opponent in-
teractions. The results are generally quite simi-
lar across the three columns of the table.
The top row of the table is the main effect of
a wrestler being on the bubble, which leads to
an excess win likelihood of roughly 12–16 per-
centage points. In those tournaments with a high
level of media scrutiny, however, these excess
wins completely disappear.14 In two of the three
specifications, the performance of wrestlers on
the bubble in high and low media scrutiny tour-
naments is statistically significant at the 0.05
level. In none of the three columns can one
reject the null hypothesis that wrestlers on the
bubble in high-scrutiny tournaments do any bet-
ter than chance. In the words of Supreme Court
Justice Louis D. Brandeis, “Sunlight is said to
be the best disinfectant.”15
When the opponent is in the running for
winning one of the special prizes awarded, any
benefit of being on the bubble also disappears.
This result is consistent with opponents in the
running for prizes being unwilling to throw a
match.
The variables designed to capture factors in-
14 To calculate the overall excess win percent for a
wrestler on the bubble in a period of high media scrutiny,
the coefficients in rows 1 and 2 are added together.
15 We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this very
appropriate quote to our attention.
TABLE 2—DETERMINANTS OF EXCESS WIN LIKELIHOODS
FOR WRESTLERS ON THE BUBBLE
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Wrestler on bubble 0.126 0.117 0.155
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
Wrestler on bubble
interacted with:
High media 0.188 0.177 0.146
scrutiny (0.071) (0.071) (0.080)
Opponent in 0.149 0.129 0.156
running for a
prize this
tournament
(0.047) (0.046) (0.052)
Number of 0.0048 0.0031 0.0024
meetings
between two
opponents in
the last year
(0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0096)
Wrestler on
bubble
0.0361 0.0195 0.0346
in his last year
of competing
(0.0398) (0.0395) (0.0493)
Years in sumo for 0.0077 0.0077 0.0091
wrestler on
bubble
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0043)
Winning 0.272 0.293 —
percentage in
other bubble
matches
between these
two stables
(0.059) (0.058)
R2 0.016 0.074 0.246
Wrestler and
opponent fixed
effects?
No Yes Yes
Wrestler-opponent
interactions?
No No Yes
Notes: The dependent variable in all three regressions is an
indicator variable corresponding to whether or not a wres-
tler wins the match. In addition to the listed interaction
terms, all main effects are also included in the specifica-
tions. Wrestler on bubble is an indicator variable that equals
1 (1) if the wrestler (opponent) is on the bubble on days
13, 14, or 15 (record of 7-7, 7-6, 6-7, 7-5, 6-6, or 5-7) but
the opponent (wrestler) is not, and 0 otherwise. Matches
from 1989, the first year of our sample, are excluded be-
cause the variable for the number of matches between the
two wrestlers in the previous year cannot be computed.
Observations where stables are unknown or no two wres-
tlers from the stables ever meet on the bubble in our data set
are also excluded from the sample. The number of obser-
vations is consequently 42,788. Standard errors are cor-
rected to account for the fact that there are two observations
per bout (one for each wrestler).
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fluencing implicit collusion achieve mixed re-
sults. The number of matches between two
wrestlers in the preceding year has an unex-
pected negative impact on a wrestler’s likeli-
hood of winning a match on the bubble,
although the coefficient is substantively small
and carries a t-statistic of far less than 1 in all of
the specifications. Wrestlers in the last year of
their career do slightly worse than expected on
the bubble, although again the result is not
statistically significant. With the exception of
the last year, however, success on the bubble
increases over the career. A five-year veteran is
about 4 percentage points (off a baseline of 13
percentage points) more likely to win on the
bubble than a rookie. This last result is consis-
tent with the importance of developing a
reputation.
Finally, the bottom row of coefficients in
Table 2 measures the extent to which a wres-
tler’s success on the bubble today is influenced
by overall success rates (excluding this match)
when wrestlers from that stable meet wrestlers
from the opponent’s stable and one of the wres-
tlers is on the bubble.16 The coefficient is
strongly positive and statistically significant. As
noted above, that result that is difficult to rec-
oncile with any hypothesis other than stable-
coordinated collusion. Moreover, the size of the
coefficient is large: for each 10-percentage-
point increase in success in other bubble
matches between these two stables, the wrestler
on the bubble is 3 percentage points more likely
to win today, controlling for other factors.
B. What Happens When Wrestlers Meet
Again in the Future?
If collusion is the reason that wrestlers on the
bubble perform well, then the opponent must be
compensated in some way for losing the match.
It is possible that such payments are made in
cash, or in promises to return the favor in the
future. The likelihood that two wrestlers will
meet again soon is high: in our data 74 percent
of the wrestlers who meet when one is on the
margin for eight wins will face one another
again within a year.
Table 3 explores the pattern of match out-
comes over time for wrestlers who meet when
one is on the margin. The even columns include
wrestler-opponent interactions so identification
of the parameters comes only from variation in
outcomes involving the same two opponents;
the odd columns do not. The regression speci-
fications include indicator variables categoriz-
ing the timing of the meetings between two
wrestlers relative to the match where one wres-
tler is on the bubble. The omitted category is
matches preceding a bubble meeting by at least
three matches.17
Focusing first on columns (1) and (2), which
correspond to all meetings on the bubble, there
are no systematic differences in outcomes in the
two matches preceding the match on the bubble,
as reflected in the statistically insignificant co-
efficients in the top row. When the wrestler is
on the bubble (second row), he is much more
likely to win, consistent with the earlier tables.
The parameter of greatest interest is the nega-
tive coefficient for the first meeting between the
two wrestlers after the match in which the wres-
tler is on the bubble. The wrestler who was on
the margin in the last meeting is approximately
seven percent less likely to win than would
otherwise be predicted. This finding is consis-
tent with part of the compensation for throwing
a match being the promise of the opponent
returning the favor in the next meeting. There is
no evidence that any return of favors extends
beyond the next match, as two and three
matches out the winning percentages return to
normal.
The final four columns of Table 3 replicate
the first two columns, except that the sample is
divided into cases where the wrestler wins when
on the margin versus instances when the wres-
tler loses when on the margin.18 One would not
expect a wrestler to intentionally lose in future
meetings to an opponent who does not throw the
match on the margin. Thus, breaking down the
16 Because wrestlers do not change stables over the
course of their careers, there is no usable variation in this
variable when wrestler-opponent interactions are included
in column (3).
17 We have experimented with other groupings of
matches, for instance allowing a different coefficient for
matches preceding/following the bubble match by more
than three meetings. The parameters of interest are not
sensitive to alternative specifications.
18 In columns (3)–(6), the actual matches taking place on
the bubble are excluded from the regression since there is no
variation. In columns (3) and (4), all bubble matches are
won by the wrestler on the bubble; in columns (5) and (6),
no matches are won by the wrestler on the bubble.
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data in this way provides a natural test of the
hypothesis that the poor performance in the next
match is due to a deferred payoff to an opponent
who threw a match. The data provide clear
support for the collusion hypothesis. Wrestlers
who win on the bubble tend to do slightly better
than expected leading up to the bubble match,
then do much worse in the next meeting with
the same opponent. Relative to the surrounding
matches, the first post-bubble match sees the
wrestler losing approximately 10 percentage
points more frequently than would be expected
(i.e., row 3 minus row 1).
The pattern for wrestlers who lose to the oppo-
nent when on the margin for achieving eight wins
is very different. In the matches just prior to the
bubble match, the wrestler is slightly underper-
forming. This continues unaffected through the
post-bubble matches as well. Unlike columns (1)–
(4), there is no downward spike in wins following
the bubble match. The finding that winners on the
bubble fare badly the next time they face the same
opponent, but losers do not, is consistent with the
match-rigging hypothesis, but not with an effort
story. If increased effort is responsible for strong
performances in matches on the margin, there is
no reason to expect systematic underperformance
the next time the two wrestlers meet, and certainly
19 When two wrestlers meet and both are on the bubble,
there is similarly no evidence that the wrestler who wins
fares more poorly the next time the two wrestlers meet. This
is consistent with no match rigging occurring when both
wrestlers are on the bubble, as predicted by the model.
More generally, there is no evidence of negative serial
correlation in match outcomes. When multiple lags of past
match outcomes between the two wrestlers are added to the
specifications, the coefficients are positive.
TABLE 3—WIN PERCENTAGES IN PRECEDING AND SUBSEQUENT MATCHES
(For Two Wrestlers Who Meet When One is on the Margin in the Final Three Days of a Tournament)
Variable
All Matches on the
Margin
Only Matches in
Which the Wrestler on
the Margin Wins
Only Matches in
Which the Wrestler on
the Margin Loses
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
One or two matches prior to the 0.002 0.005 0.020 0.019 0.041 0.035
bubble match (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.022)
Bubble match 0.151 0.164 — — — —
(0.010) (0.014)
First meeting after bubble match 0.073 0.062 0.082 0.079 0.056 0.040
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
Second meeting after bubble match 0.002 0.005 0.031 0.028 0.061 0.039
(0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.030)
Three or more meetings after 0.010 0.012 0.013 0.022 0.045 0.013
bubble match (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.017)
Constant 0.500 — 0.500 — 0.500 —
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wrestler-opponent interactions? No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.008 0.271 0.002 0.279 0.002 0.279
Notes: Entries in the table are regression estimates of the outcomes of matches between, after, and contemporaneous with
these two wrestlers meeting when one wrestler is on the margin for achieving eight wins on the last three days of the
tournament. The dependent variable in all regressions is an indicator variable for whether the wrestler wins a match. The unit
of observation is a wrestler match. The first two columns correspond to all wrestlers who meet when one is on the margin.
In columns (3) and (4), the coefficients reported correspond only to those cases where the wrestler on the bubble wins the
match. Columns (5) and (6) report coefficients only for those wrestlers on the bubble who lose the match. Columns (3) and
(5) are estimated jointly, as are columns (4) and (6). Except for columns (1) and (2), bubble matches are excluded from the
regressions. The excluded category in all regressions are matches occurring more than two matches prior to a bubble match
and not falling into any of the other categories named. When a full set of wrestler and opponent fixed effects are included,
the constant is omitted. In all cases, standard errors are corrected to account for the fact that there are two observations per
bout (one for each wrestler). Number of observations is equal to 64,273.
1602 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2002
not exclusively among those who won on the
bubble.19
The payment-in-kind story suggested by the
results above is unlikely to be the only form of
compensation for wrestlers who throw matches.
Based on Table 3, roughly two-thirds of the
excess wins garnered on the bubble are returned
the next time the two wrestlers meet. This
price—two-thirds of a match down the road in
return for throwing a match today—is too low
to represent the only form of payment. When
rumors circulate about match rigging in sumo,
they often suggest the presence of cash trans-
fers, although we are able to provide no evi-
dence about this channel.
C. Do the Data Confirm Public Allegations of
Cheating by Sumo Insiders?
Two former sumo wrestlers have made pub-
lic the names of 29 wrestlers who they allege to
be corrupt and 14 wrestlers who they claim
refuse to rig matches (Keisuke Itai, 2000; Ona-
ruto, 2000; Shukan Post, 2000).20 In this sec-
tion, we investigate whether the performance on
the bubble of these two groups of wrestlers
systematically differs. If strong performance on
the bubble is due to match rigging and the
allegations are true, then one would expect the
corrupt wrestlers to do extremely well on the
bubble, whereas the honest wrestlers would do
no better in bubble matches than on any other
match.
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a re-
gression identical to equation (1), but includ-
ing a full set of interactions between whether
a match is on the bubble and the classification
of each wrestler and his opponent as either
“corrupt,” “clean,” or “status unknown.” Only
43 of the 281 wrestlers (15 percent) in our
sample are specifically identified as either
corrupt or clean. The remainder are classified
as status unknown. The whistle-blowers were
more likely to identify prominent wrestlers
with long careers, however, so over 60 per-
cent of the matches in our sample involve at
least one wrestler identified by name as either
clean or corrupt.
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation.
All of the coefficients in the table come from a
single regression. The values in the table repre-
sent excess win percentages on the bubble, i.e.,
how much better a wrestler does when on the
bubble relative to matches in which neither
wrestler is on the bubble. The columns of the
table identify the status of the wrestler on the
bubble—the wrestler who wants to buy a vic-
tory. The rows correspond to the status of the
opponent of the wrestler on the bubble—the
wrestler who might want to sell a win. When
two wrestlers identified as corrupt meet on the
bubble, the one who needs the victory is 26
percentage points more likely to win the match
than if those two wrestlers met with neither on
the bubble. This excess win percentage is highly
statistically significant. When a corrupt wrestler
meets a wrestler classified as “status unknown,”
the results are very similar. Win percentages for
the wrestler needing the victory when both
wrestlers are classified as “status unknown” are
also highly elevated (18.1 percentage points
higher), but not quite as extreme. In stark con-
trast, none of the five coefficients involving
wrestlers identified as clean are statistically sig-
nificant from zero. This implies that the out-
comes of bubble matches involving a clean
wrestler are no different than the results when
the same two wrestlers meet, but neither is on
the bubble. This result holds true regardless of
whether the clean wrestler is himself on the
bubble or facing a wrestler who is on the bub-
ble. Thus, Table 4 provides strong confirmation
not only of the claim that elevated win percent-
ages on the bubble are due to match rigging, but
also that the allegations made by the two sumo
insiders appear to be truthful. Moreover, it ap-
pears that most of the wrestlers not specifically
named by the whistle-blowers are corrupt, since
their outcomes differ only slightly from those
wrestlers named as corrupt.
III. Conclusion
This paper provides strong statistical analysis
documenting match rigging in sumo wrestling.
The incentive structure of promotion leads to
gains from trade between wrestlers on the mar-
gin for achieving a winning record and their
opponents. We show that wrestlers win a dis-
proportionate share of the matches when they
are on the margin. Increased effort cannot
20 The books that we cite are published only in Japanese.
We thank Serguey Braguinsky both for bringing the exis-
tence of this information to our attention and for translating
the relevant material for us.
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explain the findings. Match rigging disappears
in times of increased media scrutiny. Wrestlers
who are victorious when on the bubble lose more
frequently than would be expected the next time
they meet that opponent, suggesting that part of
the payment for throwing a match is future pay-
ment in-kind. Reciprocity agreements between
stables of wrestlers appear to exist, suggesting that
collusive behavior is not carried out solely by
individual actors. Allegations by sumo insiders are
demonstrated to be verified in our data.
While sumo wrestling per se is not of direct
interest to economists, the case study that it
provides is potentially of usefulness to the eco-
nomic analysis of corruption. Anecdotal allega-
tions of corrupt practices among sumo wrestlers
have occasionally surfaced, but have been dis-
missed as impossible to substantiate. In this
paper, we demonstrate that the combination of a
clear understanding of the incentives facing par-
ticipants combined with creative uses of data
can reveal overwhelming statistical evidence of
corruption. Details of the corrupt practices, the
data sources, and the telltale patterns in the data
will all vary from one application to the next.
Nonetheless, the success of our study in docu-
menting the predicted patterns of corruption in
one context raises the hope that parallel studies
with more substantive economic focus may
yield similar results.
Moreover, our analysis provides insight into
how to combat corruption. First, the match rig-
ging we identify can be directly linked to the
artificially imposed nonlinearity in incentives
for wrestlers who achieve a winning record.21
Removing this distortion to incentives would
eliminate the benefits of corruption. Second,
match rigging appears to be sensitive to the
costs of detection. Increased media scrutiny
alone is sufficient to eliminate the collusive
behavior. Presumably, other approaches to rais-
ing the expected punishment would likewise be
effective. Third, at least in the sumo context,
insiders appear to have good information about
who is corrupt. Providing strong incentives for
whistle-blowers, particularly when such accusa-
tions can be corroborated by objective data
analysis, may prove effective in restraining cor-
rupt behavior.
While perhaps beyond the scope of this pa-
per, a question of interest is why those in charge
of the sumo wrestling have not attempted to
eliminate corruption, either by eliminating the
nonlinearity or by increasing expected punish-
ments. A partial answer is that there are barriers
to entry for a second sumo league, so the com-
petitive pressure exerted on the current sumo
association is limited.22 A second possibility is
21 Nonlinearities of this sort have been shown to distort
behavior in many other contexts as well, including Robert
Topel (1983) and Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison
(1997).
22 It is worth noting that the popularity of sumo wrestling
has declined substantially over the last two decades, sug-
gesting that other forms of recreation are substitutes.
TABLE 4—EXCESS WIN PERCENTAGES ON THE BUBBLE FOR WRESTLERS LABELED BY SUMO
INSIDERS AS “CORRUPT” OR “CLEAN”
Wrestler on the Bubble Is Identified as:
Corrupt Status Unknown Clean
Opponent of
wrestler on the
bubble is
identified as:
Corrupt 0.260 0.270 0.010
(0.037) (0.021) (0.038)
Status 0.271 0.181 0.041
unknown (0.021) (0.019) (0.031)
Clean 0.036 0.033 0.022
(0.027) (0.035) (0.074)
Notes: Entries in the table are coefficients from a regression with full set of interactions
between whether a match is on the bubble and the classification of a wrestler and his opponent
as clean, corrupt, or status unknown by two sumo insiders (Itai, 2000; Onaruto, 2000; Shukan
Post, 2000). The regression is identical to equation (1) in the text, except for the inclusion of
the aforementioned interactions. Twenty-nine wrestlers are categorized as corrupt, 14 are
classified as clean. The remainder of wrestlers are not specifically named and are categorized
as status unknown. Standard errors are corrected to take into account that there are two
observations per bout (one for each wrestler). Number of observations is equal to 64,273.
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that the nonlinear payoff structure generates
interest in otherwise unimportant matches on the
final days of the tournament. For the same rea-
son that wrestlers want to rig the matches on the
bubble, the fans are interested in the outcome.
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